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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the problem of preempted innocent threats.
The problem arises in tort law and concerns the measure of damages
due a plaintiff.
The problem of preempted innocent threats goes like this: A force,
condition, or event is a threat if it may cause physical harm to a
person or property. An "innocent threat" is a threat that arises either
naturally or as a result of nontortious human activity. Lightning bolts,
common diseases, cars reasonably driven, and guns fired with due
care are innocent threats. A threat is "preempted" if, due to the
existence of some force or condition, the threatened harm does not
materialize. The question is: When determining the compensation due
a tort plaintiff to what extent is it relevant that the defendant's
tortious conduct preempted an innocent threat to the plaintiff?
Some examples may help clarify the question above. There are
some cases where it is clearly relevant that an innocent threat was
preempted by the defendant's tortious conduct. For example, imagine
P is a high school teacher in a large city. He hires a taxi to take him
to his destination. The taxi is owned and operated by the driver, D.
On the way, D drives negligently and the taxi crashes. Luckily, D
escapes without serious injuries. P, however, is killed. Under tort
law, P's estate is entitled to compensation from D for, among other
things, the income P lost due to the accident.' But how much income
1. Claims for lost future wages are usually brought in wrongful death actions. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES 430 (2d ed. 1993). Some states allow claims for future lost wages to be brought in
survival actions. Id. at 425.
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is that? This depends in part on how long P would have worked if he
had not been injured.2 How long P would have worked, in turn, may
be a function of what else might have prevented him from working.
For example, in determining the extent of P's lost income, it would
be relevant that, at the time of the accident, P was in the initial stages
of an untreatable form of brain cancer and that, had it not been for the
accident, P would have had to retire from work in six months.3
Where these facts can be established at trial, D's liability will be
limited.' He will be liable for six months' worth of lost wages (from
the time of the accident up to the point when he would have retired
due to cancer), but no more.' In this case-which I shall refer to as
the "Incurable Cancer Case"-the cancer was an innocent threat that
could have caused P to retire and not receive future wages. It was,
however, the taxi accident that actually prevented him from receiving
his wages. The risk posed by the incurable cancer to P's career never
materialized. Thus, the defendant's tortious conduct preempted an
innocent threat, and, in light of this preempted threat, the plaintiffs
recovery for lost wages will be greatly reduced from what it
otherwise would have been.6
2. Id. at 461-62.
3. See infra note 8.
4. Id.
5. Professor Dobbs stated in the context of wrongful death and survival actions that "the plaintiff is
permitted to show that the decedent in a death case was in excellent health just before the mortal injury;
and likewise the defendant might show .. . the decedent or plaintiff was in poor health and unlikely to
live long in any event." 2 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 463. See also Butera v. Dist. of Columbia, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 25, 35-36 (D.D.C. 1999) (noting that the defendant properly introduced evidence of the effect
of HIV status on victim's life-expectancy to mitigate its liability to plaintiff for victim's future earnings)
aff'd in part, rev'd on other grounds by Butera v. Dist. of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
Smith v. Southland Corp., 738 F. Supp. 923, 925-26 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that evidence regarding
plaintiffs alcoholism and drug use was admissible for purposes of determining plaintiffs loss of
eaming capacity); Follett v. Jones, 481 S.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Ark. 1972) (limiting liability to actual life
expectancy where defendant was responsible for the death of a man with terminal cancer); Groat v.
Walkup Drayage & Warehouse Co., 58 P.2d 200, 204 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (noting that the jury properly
reduced damages in wrongful death suit based on plaintiffs high blood pressure, the hardening of his
arteries; and his diseased heart and kidneys); Harlow v. Chin, 545 N.E.2d 602, 611-12 (Mass. 1989)
(noting that defendant properly introduced evidence that a quadriplegic's life expectancy is substantially
shorter than that of a non-quadriplegic to reduce its liability for future medical expenses and pain and
suffering); Kilmer v. Browning, 806 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) ("[P]robative value [of
standard mortality tables] may be weakened by evidence of ill-health and these matters may be
considered by the jury in weighing the testimony.").
6. See infra note 8.
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The preceding analysis of the Incurable Cancer Case is well-
established. Other cases involving innocent threats, however, are
more controversial. Here is one: P is a high school teacher in perfect
health. D owns and operates a taxi. P hires D to drive him to a cruise
ship-which, following the tradition of the literature, I shall refer to
as a "steamer."7 The steamer is to take him for a ten-day cruise to
Alaska. On the way to the steamer, D drives negligently and gets into
a serious accident. D escapes without significant injury, but P is
permanently disabled. P sues D. When determining what
compensation is due P, is it relevant that the cruise ship P would have
taken struck an iceberg, sank, and all the passengers and crew were
drowned? Assume that absent the taxi accident, P would have
boarded the steamer and would have drowned, and that these facts
can be established at trial. Should P-in what I shall refer to as the
"Doomed Steamer Case"-be denied recovery for lost wages
analogously to the partial denial of recovery for wages in the
Incurable Cancer Case? Is a taxi accident's preempting of potentially
career-ending cancer analogous to a taxi accident's preempting of a
potentially career-ending steamer sinking?
Another controversial case is the Merged Fire Case. P owns
property that borders on a forest in a public park. D is a camper in the
forest. Due to the negligence of D in tending his campfire, a forest
fire starts. The fire spreads towards P's property, threatening to
engulf it. Before it reaches P's property, however, the fire merges
with another equally large forest fire moving toward P's property.
The second fire is a naturally occurring one, started by lightning. The
two fires merge and P's property, including his house, is burnt to the
ground. P sues D for negligence. Should P's recovery be reduced or
eliminated because, in the absence of the fire started by D, the
naturally occurring fire would have destroyed his house?8
7. See, e.g., Robert J. Pcaslcc, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1139
(1934).
8. The two controversial cases are structurally similar. In both the Doomed Steamer Case and the
Merged Fire Case, the defendant's tortious conduct prevents an innocent threat-the iceberg's drowning
of P, the natural fire's independent destruction of P's house-from being realized. For purposes of
exposition, this Article will generally focus on the former case and return to the latter only toward the
end of the Article.
706 [Vol. 30:3
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In exploring these questions, this Article proceeds as follows: Part
I reviews the positions commentators have taken on the problem of
preempted innocent threats in the context of the Doomed Steamer
Case;9 Part II considers and evaluates arguments that seek to
distinguish the Incurable Cancer Case, on one hand, from the
Doomed Steamer Case and the Merged Fire Case, on the other hand,
based on considerations of foreseeability.' 0 Part III seeks to limit the
relevance of preempted innocent threats to damages based not on
considerations of foreseeability, but based on the concept of
identity."
As will be seen, this Article argues for a minority position-that
for at least a significant subset of claims, including the Doomed
Steamer Case, the preemption of an innocent risk by an actor's
tortious conduct should reduce the amount of damages that a victim
may recover in a tort action. Specifically, this Article will advance
the claim that identity is a key concept in analyzing cases of
preempted innocent threats. According to this Article, the preemption
of an innocent threat should reduce the damages available to a
plaintiff in those cases where, and only where, had it not been for the
defendant's tortious conduct, the plaintiff would have suffered the
very same, or identical, harm as the harm actually suffered. The
"identity of harm test," it is contended, best fits with existing case
law and our moral intuitions about how the law should resolve cases
of preempted innocent threats.
The scope of this Article is limited in three respects. First, it will
not discuss the very different issue of what should happen if the
preempted threat is not innocent but arises from a third person's
intentionally wrongful or negligent conduct. Second, it will not
discuss the criminal law or contract law incarnations of the
problem.12 Third, it will focus on substantive rules of tort liability
9. See infra Part I.
10. SeeinfraPartil.
II. See infra Part Ill.
12. The criminal law version of the problem is usually referred to as the problem of "unknowing
justification." Should an accused be able to raise as a full or partial defense the fact that unknown to
him, his otherwise criminal conduct was, with the benefit of hindsight, the correct conduct because it
preempted a more serious threat? This problem has received greater scholarly attention than the tort
707
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and damages and will not discuss evidentiary issues, such as the
burden of proof associated with the implementation of the
substantive rules.
I. SOME VIEWS ON THE PROBLEM
Commentators have taken various positions on the problem of
preempted innocent threats.13  Based on these positions,
commentators can be roughly divided into two schools. Those in the
first school emphasize that in cases like the Doomed Steamer Case,
the preemption of the innocent threat was in some sense highly
contingent or unforeseeable, and conclude that the preemption is
therefore legally irrelevant and should not reduce the plaintiffs
recovery ("Full Recovery School").14 Commentators in the second
school take the view that there is no legally relevant difference
between the Incurable Cancer Case and the Doomed Steamer Case,
and hence in the Doomed Steamer Case, plaintiff's recovery for lost
wages should be reduced or eliminated ("Reduced Recovery
School").' 5 As a general matter, these opposing views are offered
with little argument and cursory analysis. This part of the Article
surveys the existing literature discussing the Doomed Steamer Case
and its implications.
issue considered in this article. MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 180-81 (1993); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:
THE GENERAL PART 23-27 (2d ed. 1961); Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the
Logical Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defence, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 251 (1995);
Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547, 1586-99
(2002); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, in HARM AND
CULPABILITY, 45, 47 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
13. David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L. REV.
1127, 1144-45 (1999); John Marks, Symmetrical Use of Universal Damages Principles-Such as the
Principles Underlying the Doctrine of Proximate Cause-to Distinguish Breach-Induced Benefits That
Offset Liability from Those That Do Not, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1387 (2009); Pcaslee, supra note 7.
14. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Ijury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Stephen Perry, Harn,
History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1283 (2003); David W. Robertson, The Common
Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765 (1997).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965); Peaslee, supra note 7, at 1135.
708 [Vol. 30:3
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A. Robert Peaslee
The problem of preempted innocent threats is first clearly stated in
a 1934 article by Robert Peaslee.' 6 Peaslee compares two cases. The
first is Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.17 Dillon was a young
boy who, with his friends, routinely played on a bridge.' 8 The bridge
was very close to electrical wires owned by the defendant, Twin
Gas.' 9 One day, sitting on a bridge girder, Dillon lost his balance,
instinctively threw out his arm, and grabbed an electrical wire to save
himself from falling.20 The wire was charged with a high-voltage
current, and Dillon was electrocuted.2' Plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's failure to insulate the wires was negligent.22 On appeal of
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the court held that Dillon
should not recover for lost wages if the jury were to find that even if
the wires had been insulated, Dillon would still have fallen, and as a
result of the fall, would have died.23 Peaslee agrees with the court's
holding in Dillon, stating, "The loss of balance and incipient fall
were accomplished facts, the serious consequences of which were
certain, before the defendant's wrong became an operative cause." 24
Peaslee also considers the case of a doomed steamer,25 which
inspired the example at the beginning of this Article. Peaslee would
treat Dillon and the Doomed Steamer Case differently, allowing no
16. Peaslcc, supra note 7, at 1134. A similar case was discussed by the ancients in the context of
contracts. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 251 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing
JUSTINIAN THEODOR MOMMSEN, DIGESTA IUSTINIANI AUGUSTI (1870) and BERNHARD WINDSCHEID,
LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS 258 (1862)). Labco asserts that a plaintiff could recover the cost of
the goods, but Paul and Winscheid assert that no damages are due a plaintiff whose goods are, in breach
of contract, placed on the wrong ship, which sinks during its voyage, where the ship that the goods
should have been placed on also sinks during its voyage. HART & HONORt, supra at 251-52.
17. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. Ill (N.H. 1932).
18. Id. at 111-12.
19. Id. at Ill .
20. Id. at 112.
21. Id.
22. Id. at I 11.
23. Dillon, 163 A. at 114-15 ("Although he died from electrocution, yet, if by reason of his
preceding loss of balance he was bound to fall except for the intervention of the current, he either did
not have long to live or was to be maimed. In such an outcome of his loss of balance, the defendant
deprived him, not of a life of normal expectancy, but of one too short to be given pecuniary allowance,
in one alternative, and not of normal, but of limited, caming capacity, in the other.").
24. Peasice, supra note 7, at 1135.
25. Id.at1139-41.
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reduction in damages based on the sinking of the steamer.26 Peaslee
writes, "The distinction [between Dillon and the doomed steamer] is
more readily felt than stated. . . . [O]nly known portents can be
considered. Unsuspected future developments must be
disregarded ... ."27
Peaslee equivocates somewhat, both with respect to his conclusion
and its grounds. Peaslee allows, "It is quite possible to advance some
logical support for recovery of full damage[s] in the Dillon case, or
no damage[s] in that of the traveller [sic]." 28 Peaslee suggests that
disregarding unsuspected future developments has the advantage of
practicality and uniformity, and may be supported by unspecified
"moral considerations." 29 Peaslee also considers the case of a
defendant who negligently starts a fire that bums a house where next
week "a great and innocently caused conflagration swept the site." 30
Peaslee claims that the plaintiffs recovery should not be reduced
because the innocent fire was not in "active operation" when the
defendant's act caused the destruction of the house, nor was it "of
sufficient imminence to make the result certain."31 Foreseeability,
activeness, imminence, morality, and practicality, in some measure,
thus underlie Peaslee's "known portents" standard. Based on his
analysis of the Doomed Steamer Case and the case of the fires,
Peaslee falls into the Full Recovery School.
By combining a number of considerations generally relevant to
tort, it is likely that Peaslee's standard retains enough flexibility to
accommodate a range of reasonable outcomes. Yet this analysis
appears both ad hoc and arbitrary. Why, for example, should it matter
that the innocent fire itself was not in active operation if the forces
that caused the innocent fire were in active operation? How imminent
must a result be before it is judged to be "certain," and why should it
matter? Whose perspective should count when determining whether a
26. Id. at 1140.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Peaslec, supra note 7, at 1134.
31. Id.
710 [Vol. 30:3
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future development is "unsuspected"? Peaslee's approach seems to
offer courts little guidance for resolving future cases. It is not
surprising that his word was not the last word.
B. Restatement (Second) of Torts
The problem of preempted innocent threats is considered in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was published in 1965.32
Section 920 of the Restatement falls in the Restatement's chapter on
damage remedies.33 That Section provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages,
to the extent that this is equitable. 34
A lot obviously turns on the meaning of "equitable." Implicitly
elaborating on this term, the Commentaries to Section 920 state, "The
rules of causation applicable to the creation and extent of
liability . . . apply to the diminution of damages."35 As an illustration,
the Restatement gives the Doomed Steamer example: "A knocks B
down, as a result of which B is prevented from taking a ship that later
sinks with all on board." 36 According to the Restatement, B's
damages for battery are "not diminished by his escape from death
resulting from A's act." 37 The Restatement thus resolves the Doomed
Steamer Case by ignoring the preemption of the risk to the plaintiff,
apparently on the ground that under the rules of causation, the
prevention of B's death was not proximately caused by A's blow.
The Restatement, however, provides no justification for its
interpretation of "equitable" in terms of causation rules and cites no
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. cmt. d.
36. Id. cmt. d, illus. 8.
37. Id.
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supporting case law.3 8 The Restatement's position on the issue should
be noted, but not treated as authoritative.
Because proximate cause rules are largely a matter of
foreseeability, the Restatement, like Peaslee, falls into the Full
Recovery School.
C Joseph H. King
Joseph H. King considers the problem of preempted innocent
threats in an influential 1981 article on the topic of recovery for lost
chance.39 To resolve the problem, King introduces the concept of
"attachment."4 o King argues that the law should take into account-
and so reduce or deny a plaintiffs recovery-threatening forces or
conditions, such as incurable cancer, which have "attached" before
the tortious condition created by the defendant has attached.4 1 King
states that a condition has attached where it "could not be avoided
even if the victim were aware of its existence . . . ."42 Based on this
analysis, King concludes that Dillon's prospect of falling to his death
should have been taken into account, but the iceberg threatening the
doomed steamer should not be.4 3 At the point just before he reached
the uninsulated wires, Dillon could not have avoided the loss of
balance, which presumptively would have killed him, but he could
have avoided the wires if he had known contacting them would result
in his electrocution.44 Thus, the risk of falling to death had attached
before the possibility of electrocution had.4 5 Therefore, the risk of
death from the fall should have been taken into account when it came
to Dillon's recovery. In contrast, just before the taxi passenger was
injured in the traffic accident, the risk of that accident had attached
(because it had become unavoidable), but "assum[ing] prescience,"
the threat of the iceberg could have been avoided by canceling the
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. d.
39. See generally King, supra note 14.
40. Id. at 1393.
41. Id. at 1357, 1393-94.
42. Id. at 1357.
43. Id. at 1357-58.
44. Id.
45. King, supra note 14, at 1357-58.
[Vol. 30:3712
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trip on the steamer.46 Thus, the risk from the iceberg should not be
taken into account. King claims his approach "affords an appropriate
and predictable selection mechanism" for identifying those
conditions that should be taken into account. 47 King prefers his
avoidability, or attachment, test to Peaslee's "known portents" test
because his "more accurately reflects the actual status of the affected
interest at the time of the injury."4 8
The motivation for King's avoidability test is not clear. The test
requires assessing whether a threat could be avoided if there were
knowledge of the threat, no matter how unlikely such knowledge
might be. Why should such a potentially far-fetched situation be
morally or legally relevant? Why not consider whether the threat
could be avoided by -assuming that the victim was equipped with
state-of-the-art protective gear like a parachute that would have saved
Dillon from the fall? Or consider whether some other parties'
prescience could have avoided the injury? For example, what if a
party below Dillon, knowing of his fall, could have moved a nearby
mattress under him, thus saving his life? Although tort law frequently
considers counterfactuals where actors do not make unreasonable
mistakes, invoking counterfactuals involving knowledge of
practically unknowable matters, such as whether an iceberg would
sink a ship, seems unprecedented. King provides no theory or
explanation in support of his test.49
Cogency aside, King's attachment test seems reasonably close to
Peaslee's "known portents" approach and the Restatement's
causation approach. The difference between whether some potential
threat is known, foreseeable, or could be avoided if known seems to
be a matter of degree or emphasis. Thus, King may be placed in the
Full Recovery School.
46. Id. at 1358.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1358 n.19.
49. See generally id. Another criticism of King's approach is made by David Fischer. Fischer, supra
note 13, at 1144. Fischer points out that courts use evidence of a plaintiff's bad habits to predict life
expectancy despite the fact that the detrimental effects of these habits have not yet "attached" in King's
sense of unavoidability-assuming-presciencc. Id. Thus, King's approach is inconsistent with existing
case law. See, e.g., Morris v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 117 N.W. 500 (Minn. 1908).
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D. David Robertson
In a 1997 article, David Robertson compares a minor variation of
the Doomed Steamer Case with a skydiver whose parachute has
failed and who happens to be shot by a negligent hunter just before
hitting the ground.o Robertson finds that "[t]he difference between
the two situations is easy to grasp intuitively."5' According to
Robertson, the operative line between the two cases "cannot be
described with precision, but the rule is roughly" that the law should
take into account "only those threats that are so far advanced and so
nearly certain at the time of the accident" that ignoring their
similarity to pre-existing conditions, such as diseases, "would seem
dishonest."52  While Robertson's "so-far-advanced/dishonesty
approach" seems too vague to serve as a useable standard, it seems
generally in line with the approaches that have preceded it. Robertson
is another member of the Full Recovery School.
E. David Fischer
David Fischer takes a different view of the problem of preempted
innocent threats in his 1999 article. With respect to damages
generally, Fischer's view is that "[fjrom a fairness perspective,
imposing liability for harm duplicated by non-tortious forces is
undesirable because it would give the plaintiff a windfall. Corrective
justice requires no more than that the plaintiff be restored to the
position that he would have occupied if the tort had not occurred." 54
But how should this principle be applied in the context of
preempted innocent threats? Fischer cites a number of examples of
courts taking into account the preemption of an innocent threat, but
concedes that "[iut is difficult to determine when to apply the rule
exonerating the tortfeasor from having to pay damages for harm that
50. Robertson, supra note 14, at 1797-98.
51. Id. at 1798.
52. Id.
53. See generally Fischer, supra note 13.
54. Id. at 1136.
714 [Vol. 30:3
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would have been duplicated by a pre-existing potential cause."5 s In
this regard, Fischer considers the Doomed Steamer Case and King's
attachment test. He believes that the attachment test is best
understood as a test to preclude defendants from relying on overly
speculative matters to reduce their liability. 6 Fischer, however, cites
miscarriage cases involving pain and suffering where no discount
was made for the pain and suffering, which certainly would have
been experienced by the expectant plaintiff had she delivered her
child. 7 Such cases, Fischer obverses, are inconsistent with the
evidentiary theory of preempted threats.58 He believes, following
Hart and Honor6, 59 that a distinction may be drawn between
economic losses and pain and suffering.60 According to Fischer, "our
sense of justice is less offended when a defendant is exonerated for
potentially duplicated economic losses as opposed to potentially
duplicated pain and suffering."6 1 In cases of economic injuries,
failing to reduce awards may violate our sense of justice by allowing
plaintiff a "windfall."62 Fischer ultimately rejects King's approach to
the Doomed Steamer Case and, in the context of another set of facts,
indicates that the extent of liability should depend simply "on the
quality of proof."63 Because he rejects King's approach, and does not
consider any other reason not to reduce damages, it appears Fischer
would allow a reduction in damages in the Doomed Steamer Case, at
least assuming that the defendant could establish with sufficient
55. Id. at 1142.
56. Id. at 1143.
57. Id. at 1144 n.92 ("See Morris v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 117 N.W. 500, 502 (Minn. 1908); Plonty
v. Murphy, 84 N.W. 1005, 1006-07 (Minn. 1901); Occhipinti v. Rhccm Mfg. Co., 172 So. 2d 186, 190
(Miss. 1965); see also Big Sandy & Cumberland R.R. Co. v. Blankenship, 118 S.W. 316, 317-18 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1909); Graf v. Taggert, 204 A.2d 140, 146 (N.J. 1964); Endrcsz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901,
906 (N.Y. 1969); Raynor v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 126 P. 91, 93 (Wash. 1912). But see Nevala v.
City of Ironwood, 205 N.W. 93, 94 (Mich. 1925); Hawkins v. Front-St. Cable Ry. Co., 28 P. 1021, 1024
(Wash. 1892).").
58. Id. at 1144.
59. Hart and Honor& state that "there is an argument" for treating economic loss and pain and
suffering differently. They fail, however, to identify what that argument is. HART & HONORt, supra
note 16, at 251.
60. See geneially Fischer, supra note 13.
61. Id. at 1144.
62. Id. at 1145.
63. Id. at 1146.
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certainty that plaintiff would have been drowned if he had taken the
steamer. Fischer is thus the first scholar who falls into the Reduced
Recovery School.64
F. Stephen Perry
In a 2003 article, the legal philosopher Stephen Perry considers an
updated version of the Doomed Steamer Case involving an airplane
that crashes.65 Perry states that his moral intuition is that
compensation should not be reduced based on the unrealized
possibility of the plaintiffs death in the airplane. 66 Perry sees the
beneficial avoiding of the doomed aircraft as a potential "offset" of
the harm actually caused.67 However, according to Perry, the offset is
"too much of a coincidence" and "too little connected" to the
defendant's tortious conduct to be taken into account. 68 Perry likens
the case to one where the defendant's tortious conduct places the
plaintiff under a tree that just happens to fall. 69 According to Perry,
defendant would bear no liability for the harm caused by the tree
under the doctrine of proximate cause. 70 Perry argues that similar
considerations of the moral irrelevance of coincidental events should
rule out mitigation based on the doomed airplane." Perry thus draws
an explicit connection between causal limits on harm and limits on
offsets, and so advances a position along the lines of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. 72 Perry concedes that a respectable argument
could probably be made that would come out the other way.7 3 Perry,
however, does not articulate such an argument. Accordingly, Perry
may be placed in the Full Recovery School.
64. Fischer, however, does not explain why our sense of justice is more offended by full recovery in
the Doomed Steamer Case-assuming sufficient proof-than in cases involving claims for pain and
suffering.
65. Perry, supra note 14, at 1288.
66. Id. at 1312.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1313.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Perry, supra note 14, at 1313.
72. Id. See discussion supra Section II. B.
73. Perry, supra note 14, at 1313.
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G. John Goldberg
Professor Goldberg discusses the updated Doomed Steamer Case
in an article contained in the same symposium issue as Perry's.7 4
Goldberg believes that the operative question is whether the
avoidance of the airplane death should be viewed as an offset that
mitigates damages.75 He acknowledges that most have the strong
intuition that it should not be.76 Goldberg seeks to explain this
intuition by appealing to the law of restitution.7 7 Goldberg notes that
a taxi driver who without negligence fails to deliver the passenger on
time to a doomed airplane would have no claim for an award under
the law of restitution. 7 Goldberg explains "the fortuitous conferral of
an unrequested benefit will not support a claim in restitution."79
Likewise, Goldberg implies there should be no reduction on an award
in a torts suit, and so he too falls into the Full Recovery School.
One difficulty with Goldberg's analysis is that it fails to account
for the Incurable Cancer Case. In that case, D negligently crashed the
taxi P rode in and P died, thus avoiding the detrimental future effects
of the cancer he suffered from. Clearly if the crash had produced no
significant injuries, but had miraculously cured P's cancer, D would
have no claim against P for unjust enrichment. Why then should the
preemption of the threat of the incurable cancer be taken into account
in a tort action when it is bestowed as gratuitously as the benefit of
not traveling on a doomed airplane?
In addition, Goldberg also considers Perry's position that the
avoiding of the airplane crash should be legally irrelevant because it
was a benefit that was "fortuitous."80 Goldberg uses the term,
"symmetry principle," to describe the idea that the limits on liability
for harms (e.g., proximate causation or foreseeability limits) should
symmetrically apply to bar reductions in damages based on the
74. John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1333
(2003).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1333-34.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1334.
80. Goldberg, supra note 74, at 1333-34; Peny, supra note 14, at 1312-13.
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preemption of innocence threats.8 i Just as the defendant would not be
liable for a plaintiffs death where his negligent conduct had placed
the plaintiff on the streamer that sank, so defendant's liability would
not be reduced where his negligence prevented the plaintiffs
potential death by drowning. 8 2 Stated more formally, the argument
for allowing P full recovery might run like this:
(1) D negligently injures P, and, as a result, P does not take
Steamer-1 that is hit by an iceberg, killing all aboard. P
eventually recuperates.
(2) Imagine that, contrary to fact, as a result of P's injury, P took
Steamer-2, which is hit by an iceberg, killing P and all aboard.
(Perhaps P had taken Steamer-2 to convalesce from the injury D
negligently caused.)
(3) Assume, as seems quite likely, that in such a case D's
liability would not extend to liability for P's drowning on the
ground that D's drowning was not proximately caused by D's
tortious conduct.
(4) The harm in fact preempted by D's conduct (death on
Steamer-1) is comparable to the harm caused in the imagined
case (death on Steamer-2).
(5) Therefore, per the symmetry principle, just as D's liability
would not have been extended based on drowning on a cruise, so
D's liability should not be reduced in light of the fact his tortious
conduct prevented P from drowning on a cruise.
Goldberg, however, does not endorse the symmetry principle.83
81. Goldberg, supra note 74, at 1334.
82. Id. The terms "proximate cause" and "scope of liability" rules shall be used interchangeably.
83. See id. at 1342 ("The preceding sketches an account of the rationale for a proximate cause
limitation on responsibility for harms (and, if the symmetry principle holds, an equivalent limitation on
credit for benefits conferred).") (emphasis added). At least one court has reasoned along the lines of the
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H. The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Michael Green
Michael Green is one of the reporters for the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. 84 Unlike the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Restatement (Third) of Torts
appears to take no position on the Doomed Steamer Case. The
hypothetical is not specifically addressed. The Merged Fire Case,
mentioned at the beginning of this Article, however, is.8 1 In the
Merged Fire Case, there are two independently originating fires.
Each is sufficient to destroy a given property. One of the fires is
tortiously started by the defendant. The fires merge and the resultant
conflagration engulfs the plaintiffs property. Under Section 27 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, both fires would be treated as factual
causes of the property's destruction. 86  Furthermore, the
commentaries to Section 27 specify that the same analysis would
apply if one of the fires was nontortiously started, for example
through an innocent accident or a natural cause such as lightning.8 7
An actor's tortious conduct's being a factual cause of harm, however,
apparently does not necessitate that the actor will be liable for the full
amount of the harm. The commentaries state that whether the
property owner's damages should be reduced in light of the fact they
would have been destroyed anyway is outside of the scope of the
Restatement and belongs to the law of damages.8 8 The Restatement
(Third) of Torts thus punts on the ultimate question of whether the
tortious fire starter in the Merged Fire Case will have to compensate
the property owner. 89
symmetry principle. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Young, 909 F.2d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
("Whilc the rationale [for liability] is obscure . . . there is at least a symmetry with the limitation of
liability under the concept of proximate cause. Just as the latter excuses the defendant when a fluke
extends the consequences of his negligence, so [a liability] rule denies him any benefit when a fluke
renders his negligence causally redundant.").
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (2005).
85. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
86. Section 27 provides: "If multiple acts occur, each of which under § 26 alone would have been a
factual cause of the physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is
regarded as a factual cause of the harm." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2005).
87. Id. at cmt. d.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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The case of the merged tortious and nontortious fires is structurally
similar to the Doomed Steamer Case. In both cases, but for the
existence of a nontortious force (the lightning and the iceberg), the
negligent conduct (the igniting of the first fire and the negligent
driving of the taxi) would be the but-for cause of plaintiffs loss.
Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that the Restatement (Third) of
Torts would take the position that the resolution of the Doomed
Steamer Case is also outside of its scope.
Green, in his 2006 article, The Intersection of Factual Causation
and Damages,90 seeks to elucidate the Third Restatement's approach
to factual causation. In so doing, he considers cases of preempted
innocent threats. First, he observes that the preemption of a broad,
statistically-defined set of life-threatening risks is always considered
relevant in tort actions for wrongful death or permanent disability
where lost wages are sought. 91 It is well-established that a defendant
may submit actuary tables about life expectancy to establish the
limits of plaintiffs earning capacity. 92 Such tables imply that but for
the defendant's tortious conduct, some other event would have
occutred that would have terminated plaintiffs ability to earn
income. Thus, some preempted threats are legally relevant. Next, he
discusses the case of a plaintiff rendered a paraplegic in an
automobile accident who later contracts a neurological disease that
would have deprived her of the same use of her body had she not
already lost it in the automobile accident.93 He implies that even
though statistical proof is not involved, the law correctly reduced the
plaintiffs recovery in such a case.94 Furthermore, immediately before
his article's conclusion, Green rejects the position that problems of
proof should, as a categorical matter, result in events like a steamer's
sinking being excluded from consideration in mitigating damages.
Green states:
90. Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV.
671, 671-72 (2006).
91. Id. at688.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 692.
94. Id.
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Indeed, cases in which plaintiffs who suffer tortious injury and
have a disease that may produce duplicated harm some time in
the future are even less sympathetic cases for discounting
damages than the accident victim who avoids the doomed airline
flight because in the latter case, we know the disposition of the
duplicating causal possibility ... .95
Green thus implies that tort law should reduce P's claim for
damages in light of the preemption of the risk from the iceberg.
Green then adds in a footnote:
The fact that the duplicating cause in one is a disease or other
physical attribute of the plaintiff while in the other it is an
exogenous event, whether manmade or an act of God, might cut
the other way, but I do not see a reason why that should be so. 96
Green thus declines to distinguish between settled case law
permitting a reduction in damages, such as the actuary-table cases,
and controversial cases, like the Doomed Steamer Case. Green, along
with Fischer, falls into the Reduced Recovery School.
While Green's analysis is persuasive, it may be faulted for not
investigating the possibility of distinguishing between diseases and
physical attributes on one hand, and exogenous events on the other.
Because exogenous events have a quality of being unattached,
avoidable, and nonproximate, such a distinction may hold an
attraction for some. Indeed, Green's very act of identifying the
distinction in a footnote, even if only to dismiss the distinction,
suggests there is enough to it to warrant further attention.
. John Marks
John Marks is the first scholar who explicitly endorses the
symmetry principle. In his 2009 article, Marks seeks to develop a
theory of when breach-derived benefits, such as employment
95. Id. at 708.
96. Grecn, supra notc 90, at 708 n.143.
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benefits, should be treated as damage offsets in breach of contract
cases.97 Advancing a trans-substantive theory of offsets, Marks
proposes that offsets in contract cases should be governed by the
same rules as offsets in tort cases.98 Offsets raise the same issue as
preempted innocent threats since a reduction in recovery based on the
preemption of an innocent threat may be characterized as an offset.
According to Marks, tort offset rules reflect the same principles of
risk nexus, culpability, and policy that apply to limit the scope of a
defendant's liability for consequences of tortious conduct.9 9
Marks's analysis, however, does little to illuminate the problem of
preempted innocent risks. Marks argues that some aspects of tort
rules for scope of liability parallel those for offsets.'00 For example,
under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, all things equal, a
defendant's scope of liability is greater for negligent acts than
intentionally tortious acts.o'0 Pursuant to the commentaries of Section
920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the scope of the offset
allowed is greater in cases of negligent torts than intentional torts.10 2
While not precisely a matter of symmetry, 0 3 the equitable principle
that intentional tortfeasors should bear more liability seems present in
both sets of rules. Likewise, Marks argues that "policy-based
considerations" inform both scope of liability rules and liability
offset rules.' 04 Yet broad principles of equity, like the relevance of
culpability to liability, and considerations of policy hardly establish
that more detailed scope of liability doctrines should be imported to
the area of offsets. Indeed, Marks describes the commonalities
identified above as mere "hints" of a symmetry between scope of
97. Marks, supra note 13, at 1392-93 ("[T]hc theory offered here is that, just as such doctrines limit
the scope of losses for which a defendant can be held liablc, the principles underlying these doctrines
symmetrically apply to limit the scope of bcncfits that can offset the plaintiff's recovery.").
98. Id.at 1401.
99. Id. at 1400-07.
100. See id. at 1400-01.
101. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 (2005).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. f, illus. 10-11 (2010).
103. Strict symmetry might require, in cases of intentional torts, the extension of both the scope of
result harms deemed to be legally relevant and the scope of preempted harms deemed legally relevant.
104. Marks, supra note 13, at 1414.
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liability rules and offset rules.'05 Critically, Marks never argues that
the symmetry principle should be used to resolve cases like the
Doomed Steamer Case, as opposed to the employment cases he is
primarily interested in. Rather, he cites "scholarly recognition" that
there should be no offset in the Doomed Steamer Case as evidence
for the symmetry principle.' 06 The scholarly support Marks identifies
are commentaries to Section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts and Goldberg's article, both discussed earlier.10 7 As I do not
consider these sources authoritative or compelling, Marks's
discussion does little to resolve the puzzle of preempted innocent
risks. 08
J. Summary
Over the last seventy-five years, a range of commentators have
weighed in on the problem of preempted innocent threats-or,
equivalently, the application of offsets-in torts. Most have taken the
position that there should be no reduction of the plaintiffs recovery
in cases where the defendant's tortious conduct preempted an
innocent threat that was in some sense undetermined, avoidable,
coincidental, or overly contingent relative to the position of one or
other of the parties. In contrast, a couple of commentators have taken
the position that a plaintiffs recovery should be reduced in light of
the preemption of an innocent threat, at least assuming such
preemption can be adequately established. Concerns of windfalls and
legal precedent have informed the positions of such commentators.
105. Id. at 1393.
106. Id. at 1408-09.
107. Id. at 1408-10, 1412-14.
108. Marks also considers the collateral source benefits rule. Id. at 1415-25. According to this rule,
benefits to the plaintiff, such as gifts or insurance payments made as a result of the injury, are not
considered offsets reducing the defendant's liability. Id. at 1415. The rule is a form of offset limitation.
Id. Marks believes there is a policy justification for this rule, even in cases in which its application
results in double recovery for the plaintiff. Id. at 1421. Marks states that the rule "prevents the defendant
from 'taking advantage of an externality'" and suggests that the rule ensures full compensation to
plaintiffs who are often undercompensated due to litigation costs. Id. at 1419 (citations omitted).
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II. FORESEEABILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTED INNOCENT
THREATS
This part of the Article and the next try to resolve the problem of
preempted innocent threats. The analysis begins with a well-settled
point of tort law identified by Professor Green: When determining
the damages due a plaintiff who has been tortiously disabled, courts
will take into account the plaintiffs work expectancy, i.e., how long
the plaintiff would have likely worked had she not been tortiously
injured.'09 In doing so, courts will rely on actuarial tables that predict
work expectancy on the basis of statistical evidence about potential
career-ending events, like diseases and accidents." 0 Thus, preempted
innocent threats from diseases and accidents are implicitly being
taken into account. Furthermore, as Green points out, taking into
account such statistical threats is not an arbitrary or unprincipled part
of our tort system."' In determining damages for lost wages, courts
must take into account the fact that plaintiffs work expectancy will
be limited by accidents, diseases, and the like. It would be incoherent
to award damages for lost wages on the assumption that the plaintiff
would have lived and worked forever." 2 Whether there is a viable
distinction between diseases and accidents predicted by statistical
actuarial tables and specific events like doomed steamers and merged
fires is the core of the problem of preempted innocent threats.
Where dependable and reliable actuarial tables predict that a
plaintiff will suffer some career-ending event by a certain date, the
future potential occurrence of such an event is, almost by definition,
foreseeable. In contrast, one of the most salient features of the
Doomed Steamer Case is the unexpected, improbable, contingent
nature of the events that occurred after the taxi accident and the
potential they had for harming P had the taxi accident not occurred.
109. Green, supra note 90, at 675-76.
110. E.B. Morris, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Mortality Tables as Evidence as Affected
by Lack of Normal Health, 116 A.L.R. 416 (1938).
11. Green, supra note 90, at 689.
112. Id.
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Indeed, the fact that the steamer's sinking was unexpected, etc. seems
essential to the hypothetical. Assume that D, gifted with Cassandric
foresight, had known that P was to board a steamer that would be hit
by an iceberg, resulting in the drowning of all aboard, and that the
only way he could save D's life was crashing the taxi, and sending D
to the hospital. In that case, D's conduct would be justified, and so
nontortious.11 3 Or assume that in the Merged Fired Case, discussed at
the beginning of this article, D, before starting a fire in the woods
that places P's home at risk, knew from weather reports that there
would be a very high likelihood that regardless how he tended his
fire, P's home would be consumed by flames. Because there would
be only a small possibility that his act would create the risk of putting
P in a worse position than he would have been in, D's conduct would
likely not be considered tortious.I14 The apparently critical fact that
the iceberg in the Doomed Steamer Case was unexpected or
unforeseeable suggests that its potential to end P's career should be
excluded from the determination of P's damages.
A. The Argument From the General Rule That Unforeseeable
Matters Are Not Relevant to Damage Determination
1. The General Rule and its Exceptions
The legal irrelevance of unforeseeable events to a plaintiffs
recovery is a well-established doctrine of tort law." 5 For example,
consider the following variation of the Doomed Steamer Case. In this
variation (the "Falling Brick Case"), there is no iceberg, and the
steamer that P missed because of the accident safely arrives at its
destination. P, having been discharged from the hospital following
the taxi accident, drives home on a highway with an overpass. A
113. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th cd. 1971) ("It was held that
since the conduct of the defendants had no justification or social value, they were not justified in
neglecting even that slight risk, and they were therefore liable. The decision would appear to have
adopted the American formula of balancing magnitude of risk and gravity of harm against utility of
conduct, and to have applied it to foresecability in relation to 'proximate cause.'").
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 (2005).
115. See, e.g., I DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 466 (2001).
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loose brick from the overpass dislodges due to traffic vibrations and
falls through the windshield of P's car, killing him. In this variation,
P would not be able to recover in a wrongful death action. against D
even if he could establish that, had it not been for the initial taxi
accident, he would not have been driving under the overpass and
would not have been killed. Citing either the proximate causation or
scope of liability doctrines, a court might explain that such injuries
were unforeseeable, and hence outside the scope of D's liability.116
The exclusion of unforeseeable events, however, is not limited to
those that cause harm, such as falling bricks. Consider a second
variation on the Doomed Steamer Case. In this variation, there is no
iceberg and the steamer arrives safely at its destination. However, en
route to the steamer's destination, an on-board lottery is held in
which passengers try to pick the number on a ball drawn out of a hat
("Ship Lottery Case"). Assume that it can be established at trial that
P would have picked the number that was actually drawn, and
thereby would have won $1,000. I am confident that P would not be
able to recover $1,000 from D despite the fact that, had it not been
for the taxi accident, P would have won the lottery." 7 The
explanation for this result seems closely tied to the explanation for
P's not being able to recover in the Falling Brick Case. Just like the
falling brick's injuring P was not foreseeable, so too the failure of P
to win the lottery due to his not being on board to play would be
considered unforeseeable.
The Ship Lottery Case involves the unforeseeable prevention of a
potential benefit. The Falling Brick Case involves the unforeseeable
occurrence of an actual harm. These cases together suggest that the
law will not take into account the unforeseeable prevention of a
potential harm. Thus, it might be argued that the unforeseeable
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. j
(discussing the close connection between risk rules and the foresecability test); WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 42-44 (discussing proximate causation largely in terms of
foresecability).
117. There appear to be fewer cases involving unforesecable failures to receive benefits when
compared to unforesecable harm. It is not clear to me why we should expect more unexpected harms
than unexpected failures to receive benefits, because the requirement of unexpectedness seems to place
equal limits on both classes of adverse events.
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preemption of the iceberg-a potential harm causer-by the taxi
accident should not be considered in the evaluation of P's recovery.
The discussion thus far can be summarized by the following chart:
The argument above, however, permits a response. Although in
tort law the general rule is that unforeseeable events are not
considered, there are exceptions. Imagine that instead of causing a
serious accident, D's negligent driving merely caused a fender
bender. D himself is uninjured. P, however, is severely injured. The
accident caused P's head to hit the roof of the taxi. Normally, such an
impact would produce no more than a bump. But P-
unforeseeably-suffers from a previously unknown congenital birth
defect that rendered his skull abnormally susceptible to impacts. As a
result of P's "thin skull," he is severely disabled. A court determining
the damages owed to P would take into account the injuries resulting
from P's thin skull even though they were unforeseeable." 9 Or
imagine a variation of the Doomed Steamer Case in which, as in the
original hypothetical, the taxi accident was severe. Furthermore, P
was a young actor who just got his first big break-he was cast as the
lead in a planned series of mega-movies about teenage vampires. As
a result-although there is no way D could have predicted it-P was
deprived of an extremely lucrative career ("High Salary Case").
118. "lrrelevant" and "rclevant" should be construed as irrelevant or relevant to a plaintiffs recovery.
119. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31 (2005).
Section 31 provides that "[w]hcn an actor's tortious conduct causes harm to a person that, because of a
preexisting physical or mental condition or other characteristics of the person, is of a greater magnitude
or different type than might reasonably be expected, the actor is nevertheless subject to liability for all
such harm to the person." Id.
Unforeseeable Benefit Unforeseeable Harm
Falling brick-Irrelevant
Ship lottery-Irrelevant Iceberg-Arguably
Irrelevant' 18
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Again, a court would award damages based on P's actual loss of
wages despite the fact that the magnitude of this loss was
unforeseeable.120 Finally, consider the Incurable Cancer Case
presented at the beginning of this Article. It was argued that a court
assessing P's damages would have taken into account the
unforeseeable fact that P suffered from incurable cancer and that, had
it not been for the accident, P would have retired in six months.
The cases discussed thus far, including the Incurable Cancer Case,
may be summarized by the following chart:
Unforeseeable Benefit Unforeseeable Harm
Actual Falling brick-Irrelevant
Thin skull-Relevant
Potential Ship lottery-Irrelevant Incurable cancer-Relevant
High salary-Relevant Iceberg-?
In light of these cases, how should the Doomed Steamer Case be
resolved? The Unforeseeable Potential Harms category seems similar
in some ways to the Unforeseeable Actual Harms and Unforeseeable
Potential Benefits categories. In the latter two categories, there is a
distinction between matters that are relevant and irrelevant. To
determine how matters within the Unforeseeable Potential Harm
category should be treated, it seems useful to determine the rationale
for the distinctions in the other categories.'21 In light of that rationale,
the distinction may then be extended to the Unforeseeable Potential
Harm category. Accordingly, the next section examines the treatment
of matters within the Unforeseeable Actual Harms category with an
eye to isolating a principle that may be applied to resolve cases in the
Unforeseeable Potential Harm category, such as the Doomed Steamer
120. 2 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 361-62 (discussing recovery of lost wages without reference to
foresecability limitations).
121. This is the approach noted, but not investigated, by Green. Green, supra note 90, at 708 n.141.
See discussion supra Part I.H.
[Vol. 30:3728
2014] THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTED INNOCENT THREATS
Case.' 22 Stated in other words, if we can understand what is going on
when we take thin skulls into account, we may be able to decide
whether we should be taking doomed steamers into account.
2. Unforeseeable Actual Harms and the Thin Skull Rule
As a matter of legal doctrine, the doctrine of proximate causation,
also known as scope of liability limits,123 explains the result in the
Falling Brick Case. The doctrine of proximate causation is famously
murky.' 24 Roughly speaking, it provides that defendants shall not be
liable for unforeseeable harmful consequences of their tortious
conduct.125  The doctrine operates both as a liability doctrine,
establishing a necessary condition for tort liability, and a damage
doctrine, establishing limits on recovery.' 26 The Thin Skull Rule is
often presented as an exception to the requirement of proximate
causation.127 It permits recovery where a victim's harm is greater
122. This section focuses on the distinction between the Falling Brick Case and the Thin Skull Case,
because the distinction between types of actual harms is better established than the distinction
concerning types of potential benefits.
123. Section 29 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts substitutes "scope of liability" for the doctrine
earlier described as proximate cause. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. j (2005). There is likely little difference between the two in theory or
practice. See id.
124. See, e.g., 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 188 (2012) ("Many... definitions and tests [for proximate
cause] are inadequate . . . to afford a definite and invariable rule whereby a line can be drawn between
those causes that the law regards as sufficiently proximate and those that are too remote to be the
foundation of an action; the applicability of an announced definition must be determined by the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the particular case, on mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice,
policy, and precedent.").
125. Id. Explicating proximate causation in terms of foresecability is now more prevalent than
explicating it in terms of directness. It is also more common than the recent reformulation of the
doctrine in terms of negligence-creating risks. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2005). See discussion infra Part A.2.c.
126. See, e.g., I DOBBS, supra note 115, at 453-54.
127. The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts construe the Thin Skull Rule as an exception to
the general scope of liability limitation of Section 31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31 cmt. b (2005) ("[Elven in those cases in which the harm may be
found to be beyond the risk standard, the thin-skull rule ... applies and makes the tortfeasor subject to
liability for the harm."). Some scholars have conceptualized the Thin Skull Rule as embodying the
background rule of liability for direct injuries and have presented the doctrine of proximate cause as a
limited exception to it. Gary L. Bahr & Bruce N. Graham, The Thin Skull Plaintiff Concept: Evasive or
Persuasive, 15 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 428 (1982). It is also possible to characterize the thin skull
doctrine as not an exception to, but an implication of, the basic rationale of proximate cause and the risk
rule. See infra Part A.2.c.
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than might be reasonably foreseen due to the victim's preexisting
mental or physical condition.1 28
a. The Puzzle of the Thin Skull Rule
On first blush, the. distinction that tort law draws between a
victim's preexisting physical or mental condition, such as a thin
skull, and other states of affairs, such as falling bricks, may seem
surprising. Clearly they would be treated equivalently in cases where
the defendant was aware of their existence. Assuming foreseeability,
creating an unreasonable risk that a person will be hit by a falling
brick and creating an unreasonable risk that a person will be severely
injured by a light tap to the skull would both be grounds for liability.
It is only when the victim's preexisting conditions and other states of
affairs are unforeseeable that a distinction is drawn between the two.
Furthermore, even when they are unforeseeable, the distinction
between the victim's preexisting condition and other states of affairs
may appear puzzling from the perspective of tort policy. Both thin
skulls and falling bricks may place persons at risk of severe injury.
Tort law has a strong interest in compensating unforeseeable injuries,
regardless of their precise nature, because such injuries impose great
burdens on victims and their families.129 From this perspective, the
injuries of P in the Falling Brick and the Thin Skull cases seem
equally worthy of compensation.
Tort law is also concerned with fostering productive economic
activity.13 0 Potential exposure to unforeseeably high liability may
deter such activity.13' The doctrine of proximate cause has been
justified on this basis.' 32 This rationale may justify shielding D from
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31 (2005).
129. PROSSER, supra note 116, at § 43.
130. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28, 30-33
(2011).
131. William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for Predicting Liability, 23 CUMB.
L. REV. 349, 408 (1993) ("Predictability in the law is favored because citizens should not have to wait
until a court acts to know their legal rights. However, a legal right or duty defined in terms of
foresceability defies predictability: 'What consequences are sufficiently prcdictable'to foresee them?
How does a potential tortfcasor go about measuring the probability and severity of harm to a potential
victim against the cost of taking precautions?') (citations omitted).
132. See Cross, supra note 130, at 43.
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liability in the Falling Brick Case. However, liability for P's death
from a falling brick and P's incapacitation as a result of a fender
bender are equally unlikely and roughly equal in magnitude. The
prospect of paying damages for unforeseeable injuries for preexisting
conditions, such as thin skulls, seems equally likely to deter socially
desirable activity as the prospect of damages from other states of
affairs, such as falling bricks. 3 This rationale therefore does not
seem to explain why the Falling Brick Case and the Thin Skull Case
are treated differently. .
Finally, proximate cause limits have also been explained on the
ground that tort law has an interest in creating incentives for the
cheapest insurer to cover unlikely injuries.134 It may seem sensible to
require persons to carry accident insurance against being injured by-
all falling bricks, rather than to require people to carry liability
insurance to cover the cost of injuries from bricks they cause to fall.
However, it seems equally sensible to require persons to carry their
own insurance against injuries resulting from their congenital defects
and other preexisting conditions. Again, the rationale for treating
such cases as the Falling Brick Cases and the Thin Skull Cases
differently is not obvious.
b. Physical Distinctions Between Falling Bricks and Thin
Skulls
One effort to explicate the distinction between preexisting
conditions that may increase liability and equally unforeseeable states
of affairs that will not increase liability might rest on the distinction
between forces and conditions. The distinction between forces and
conditions seems a plausible candidate because it has fairly deep
metaphysical roots. A condition might be thought of as a potential
vulnerability to a force. A force would be whatever activates the
potential. All harms thus could be thought of as resulting from the
combination of a condition and a force. The Thin Skull Rule might
133. Id. at 43 n.87 (collecting sources that argue "the prospect of tort liability... inhibits
innovation") (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 300 (2002).
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be interpreted as making defendants liable for harms that result from
unforeseeable conditions, not unforeseeable forces. The
condition/force theory would make sense of the Falling Brick and
Thin Skull cases because a falling brick is easily characterized as a
force and a thin skull as a condition. If the force/condition theory
were valid, and the distinction was extended to the category of
Unforeseeable Potential Harms, there would be full liability in the
Steamer Case because the harm caused by the iceberg would likely
qualify as one caused by an unforeseeable force, not an unforeseeable
condition.
One problem with the condition/force approach to the Thin Skull
Rule is that it does not seem to account for what is intuitively its full
scope. Imagine that D negligently throws a baseball in the direction
of P, who is not looking, and a sudden and unforeseeable gust of
wind accelerates the baseball toward P so that when it hits him on the
head, he is severely injured rather than merely bruised. My sense is
that D would be held fully liable despite the fact that the
unforeseeable state of affairs, the gust of wind, seems better
described as a force than a condition or vulnerability. Like the falling
brick-our example of an unforeseeable state of affairs that would be
considered legally irrelevant-the gust of wind seems like a force
because of its active nature. Furthermore, the force/condition
distinction does not seem capable of being extended to cases of
potential harm, such as the Incurable Cancer Case. The law takes into
account the fact that incurable cancer will prevent wages from being
earned, even though cancer is not as easily described as a
vulnerability to a force. Notwithstanding the fact that it is located
inside of P's body, the cancer is a state of affairs which itself will
lead to harm in the absence of any force. Finally, even if the law did
consistently treat forces and conditions differently, there would be
the question of why it should. If forces and conditions-understood
as vulnerabilities to forces-are complementary elements of harm,
why should they be treated differently when they both seem to
contribute in critical, even if distinguishable, ways?
Nor can the Thin Skull Rule be usefully understood as
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distinguishing between states of the victim, which are legally
relevant, and extra-victim states of affairs, like falling bricks, which
are not legally relevant. First, as a matter of positive law, it is not
clear this is the relevant distinction. As suggested earlier, my
intuition is that the effect of a gust of wind would be considered as
relevant as the effects of a thin skull despite the fact that it is an
extra-victim state of affairs. Indeed, even if the inquiry is limited to
conditions, it does not seem material that the condition is identified
as a condition of the victim. Consider the case of a doctor who
prescribes drugs to a patient, creating an unreasonable risk of mild
nausea. Unforeseeably, the patient travels to a location where the
climate is much hotter than at his home, and because of this hot
climate, he experiences severe nausea. Here, an environmental
condition combines with the negligent conduct of the defendant to
produce a harm. While this case does not fit within the express terms
of Section 31 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which codifies the
Thin Skull Rule,' 35 my guess is that courts would conclude that the
doctor must compensate the patient for his experience of severe
nausea rather than merely the lesser foreseeable nausea. Second, as a
normative matter, there seems no ground for distinguishing between
conditions of the victim and other conditions. If a tortfeasor must
"take his victim as he finds him," why should he not have to take the
highway conditions as he finds them, and be liable for injuries the
plaintiff receives as a result of being hit by a falling brick upon
leaving the hospital? Indeed, it would seem more equitable that a
plaintiff bear the costs associated with his own physical condition
than those costs resulting from other unassociated factors. After all,
even if the plaintiff is not at fault for having a thin skull, for better or
worse, it is still his skull. Thus, the distinction between a victim's
condition and other conditions does not seem to be driving the Thin
Skull Rule.
Nor can preexistence be critical to a state of affairs' legal
relevance. A victim's thin skull exists prior to a defendant's
negligence. But so does the precipitous brick, the effects of which are
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31 (2005).
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not taken into account. Along the same lines, it might be thought that
what is driving the Thin Skull Rule, and therefore, what should
inform the resolution of the Doomed Steamer Case, is not merely
preexistence, but interaction with D's negligent conduct. If D
negligently throws a baseball, which severely injures P because of his
thin skull, D's throwing of the baseball, or at least the baseball, has in
some sense interacted with P's thin skull; thus, the thin skull and its
effects are relevant. In contrast, the brick that falls on P after he has
left the hospital seems not to have interacted with either D's
negligent driving or D's taxi. If this is the distinction between states
of affairs that are legally relevant and those that are not, it is difficult
to see how this distinction might be extended to potential harm-
causers, like incurable cancer and icebergs, to support the conclusion
that the former is legally relevant but the latter not. Neither interacts
with D's negligent driving, nor are their potential effects preempted
through direct interaction with D's driving or the resultant accident.
D's negligent driving did not cure P's cancer: it merely preempted
the career-shortening effects of the cancer.
Finally, it might be thought that the critical feature of legally
relevant, unforeseeable states of affairs like thin skulls is that such
states make a difference only in extent or degree. For example, in the
Thin Skull Case, P's injury due to his thin skull may be described as
merely greater-in-degree than the one that D's negligent driving
alone would have caused. In contrast, in the Falling Brick Case, P's
injury from the brick may be described as distinct from his injury
from the taxi accident. Likewise, in the High Salary Case, the benefit
not received may be described as merely greater-in-degree than the
one foreseen, while in the Ship's Lottery Case, the benefit not
received may be described as distinct from the wages P foreseeably
lost. If this is the relevant distinction, however, it does not seem like
the distinction can be extended to cases of potential harm to support
the conclusion that, although the preemption of the incurable cancer
is legally relevant, the preemption of the icebergs is legally
irrelevant. The incurable cancer, as much as the iceberg, would have
produced injuries that are most naturally described as distinct from
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the ones that were actually caused. Thus, the distinction between
states of affairs causing injuries unforeseeable in extent and those
causing injuries unforeseeable in type, even if suggested by some of
the cases thus far considered, cannot be the basis of an argument for
undiminished recovery for P in the Doomed Steamer Case.
In sum, thus far we have considered a number of physical features
of thin skulls. They are (1) preexisting (2) conditions (3) of the
plaintiff that (4) aggravated in degree the injury of the plaintiff. None
of these features, however, seem to plausibly account for the scope of
the Thin Skull Rule, nor explain why, when it comes to the
preemption of innocent threats, incurable cancer would be considered
legally relevant, but an iceberg would not.
c. Foreseeability and Thin Skulls
The previous section assumed that some states of affairs-such as
thin skulls, high salaries, and incurable cancers-were exceptions to
the general principle that unforeseeable matters are legally irrelevant
and sought a principled basis for the exception to see whether this
exception would apply in the Doomed Steamer Case. In contrast, this
section considers the argument that, properly understood, these
matters are foreseeable, but the potential drowning of P due to the
iceberg is not, and hence should be ignored when P's damages are
assessed. Thus, foreseeability-which is not an objective physical
feature of a state of affairs, but a feature of an event relative to a body
of knowledge-is considered the critical distinction between matters
that are legally relevant to the calculation of damages and those that
are not.
There is no general, commonly accepted definition of
foreseeability.136 Thus far, the discussion has presumed that such
matters as thin skulls, high salaries, incurable cancers, and
threatening icebergs were equally unforeseeable on the ground that,
136. Compare 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 211 (2012) ("Foresecability in the context of causation asks
whether an injury might reasonably have been contemplated because of the defendant's conduct."), with
I DOBBS, supra note 115, at 464 ("The foresecability or risk rule holds the defendant subject to liability
if he could reasonably foresee the nature of the harm done, even if the total amount of harm turned out
to be quite unforesecably large.").
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ex ante, they would be thought by a reasonable person roughly
unlikely to occur. As a matter of ordinary English usage, describing
these events as unforeseeable is unproblematic. Yet for purposes of
tort law, foreseeability may not simply be a function of likelihood. In
the tort context, foreseeability may be understood in terms of what
matters a reasonable person would take into account when deciding
how to act. This is the approach implicitly taken by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts. Section 29 of the Restatement reformulates the
traditional proximate causation limit.137 Instead of limiting liability to
foreseeable harms, Section 29 limits liability to harms that are the
realization of the risks that made an actor's conduct negligent.'
What risks might make an actor's conduct negligent is not simply a
function of the magnitude of the risk-understood as ranging from 0
to 1-it is also a function of the severity of the harms that are
risked.139 Risks of more severe harms should obviously be given
greater consideration than risks of lesser harms.
Likewise, the increase in risk, rather than the absolute magnitude
of the risk, may be important in determining whether a risk is
foreseeable. Imagine that a hiker asks a forest ranger which of two
trails, A or B, is safer. The ranger thoughtlessly responds, "Trail A,"
and the hiker is subsequently injured on Trail A by wild animals.
Here, the risk of wild animals on Trail A, no matter what its absolute
magnitude, would not be among the risks that made the ranger's
response negligent if there were the same risk of wild animals on
Trail B. If this were the case, pursuant to Section 29 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, the harm suffered by the hiker would
seem to be outside of the ranger's scope of liability. The risk would
be deemed unforeseeable. In contrast, if the risk of rock slides on
Trail A were greater than on Trail B, and a reasonable ranger would
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL& EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2005).
138. Id. Section 29 provides, "An actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks
that made the actor's conduct tortious." Id.
139. Id. § 3 ("A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's conduct lacks
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person's conduct will result in harm, the
foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce
the risk of harm.").
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know this, this risk would make the ranger's response negligent, and
the ranger would be liable for the injuries caused by a rock slide even
if, in absolute terms, the risk of a rock slide was small.140
This analysis of foreseeability may solve the puzzle presented in
the previous section. The relevant feature of a thin skull that makes
an actor liable for injuries that involve such feature is not its
likelihood in absolute terms, which might be very low, but its
tendency to increase the likelihood of a greater injury where there is
negligent conduct. From this perspective, one can understand why
courts might take into account an unexpected gust of wind that
accelerates a negligently thrown baseball, but might not take into
account an equally unexpected gust of wind that causes a tree branch
to break and fall on a negligently injured victim. Where an actor
makes an unreasonable decision to throw a baseball in another's
direction, the negligent throwing of the baseball increased the risk of
injury from a wind-accelerated baseball from 0 to a small amount,
but did not increase the risk of injury from a wind-blown tree branch
at all.
We may apply this analysis of foreseeability to the cases of a
person being injured and, as a result, missing a steamer that sinks.
The likelihood of P having a thin skull, or being hit by a falling brick,
or having a high salary, or having incurable cancer, or being on a
steamer hit by an iceberg may all be equally small. Indeed, all might
be associated with harms of equal severity. It does not follow,
however, that they are all equally unforeseeable in the relevant sense.
For the sake of being concrete, let us assume the likelihood of all
these events was 1/100. By driving negligently, D, in the Thin Skull
Case, increased the risk of P's suffering a serious head injury from 0
to 1/100, because there would be no risk of serious head injury if D
avoided the fender bender, and there was a 1/100 risk of serious
injury, due to P's possibly having a thin skull, if there were to be a
fender bender. In contrast, in the Falling Brick Case, the risk of P's
140. This result is expressly confirmed by Section 30 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which
provides: "An actor is not liable for [physical] harm when the tortious aspect of the actor's conduct was
of a type that does not generally increase the risk of that harm." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 30 (2005).
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being hit by a falling brick, even if that risk is 1/100 where D's
conduct sends P to the hospital, was not increased by sending P to the
hospital. Simply by driving on a public road there is, we might
imagine, a 1/100 chance of being hit by a falling brick. It is a general
background risk, the magnitude of which is unaffected by D's
negligent driving.141 Likewise, it may be argued, in cases where a
passenger is unable to board a doomed steamer due to negligence, the
chance of the passenger's drowning when his steamer is hit by an
iceberg was not decreased. This is so because, even if the accident
had prevented the passenger from being on the steamer, it is
reasonable to infer that, having missed one cruise, P would go on
another in its place, thus leaving the relevant risk at 1/100. Because
saving the passenger from the iceberg was not foreseeable in this
sense, the fact that the passenger was saved from an iceberg should
not be taken into account when assessing damages.
The foregoing argument for excluding threat-preemption from
damage calculation on the grounds of unforeseeability seems sound
for a large set of cases. However, I believe it is flawed for a not
insignificant subset. This subset likely includes the Doomed Steamer
Case, as presented at the beginning of this Article. The risk of being
drowned on a steamer which is hit by an iceberg may be
characterized as a background risk insofar as it, at least when taken
together with other similar risks, is a small but non-zero risk, the size
of which is not appreciably diminished by a wide range of negligent
conduct by others. If P is negligently tripped by D, and cannot board
the specific steamer passage he has booked, his risk of being on a
sinking steamer is no more diminished than the risk that he will be hit
141. Of course, one might argue that the risk of P being hit by a brick that falls from a bridge near the
hospital is increased by D's negligent conduct because D's negligent conduct increases the chance of
D's driving below the bridge near the hospital. There are two related responses to this argument. The
first response is that the risk of "being hit by a brick that falls from a bridge near the hospital" is not a
relevant category of risk. Risks must be described in the more general terms that reasonable people use
to think about the risks in the world, terms like "falling bricks," without reference to largely irrelevant
matters like geographical location of potential risk realization. The second response is that even though
D's conduct increased the risk of his being hit by a brick that falls from a bridge near the hospital, it
decreased the risk of his being hit by a brick that falls from another bridge because, being at the bridge
near the hospital, P is not going to be under another bridge. Thus, the increase in risk is offset by a
decrease in risk, and so does not contribute to making D's driving negligent.
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by a falling brick is increased. In contrast, in cases where a victim is
killed or permanently disabled as a result of an actor's negligence, his
risk of being disabled by what are generally regarded as background
risks drops to zero. Though it would be unusual to describe the
situation as one in which the deceased or disabled victim benefitted
from his condition, he is obviously no longer at risk of losing his
ability to work. Suffering a death or disability is an extreme form of
protection from the realization of future disability risks. Because this
change in risk level with respect to the possibility of becoming
disabled is appreciable,14 2 it should not be deemed unforeseeable and
excluded from consideration as might a subsequent injury from
falling bricks.14 3 Stated in terms of considerations relevant to a
reasonable person's decision-making, the point may be put like this:
A reasonable person trying to assess the risks he may be imposing on
others will take into account the fact the person his act threatens does
not have an unlimited life span with infinite potential earnings.
Furthermore, a reasonable person will realize that just as there is a
significant chance a person will die from preexisting conditions, such
as incurable cancer, there is a significant chance the person will die
from other innocent causes, such as car accidents, lightning bolts,
icebergs, etc. Thus a reasonable person will take into account
potential causes of death and disability, like icebergs, just like he will
take into account those like cancer. They are therefore as much
foreseeable as the presence of incurable cancer, which is
142. It may be questioned whether the chance of being "shicided" from the effects of background
risks through death or incapacitation is a significant enough occurrence to be considered foreseeable.
Consider the following hypothetical involving actual harms. P lives in an absolutely safe environment.
In this environment there are no background risks of falling bricks, wild animals, icebergs, cancer,
death, or injury in any manner. Though acting otherwise would cause D absolutely no burden, D acts in
a way that transports P into our world. Such action would be found negligent, even though the risks P is
now exposed to are merely background risks. Furthermore, any harm that P suffered, from falling bricks
or any other background risk, arc foreseeable and within the scope of D's liability.
143. Note that when it comes to potential harms, the nature of the actual injury is relevant to
determining whether a beneficial chance decrease in background risks is created. This effect exits, but is
not noticed, when it comes to actual harms. If D's negligent conduct causes a slight injury, and P is
subsequently hit by lightning when leaving the hospital, there will be no liability based on the lightning
strike, because the risk of lighting was not appreciably increased by D's negligence. In contrast, if D's
negligent conduct causes P's death, the question of whether D should be liable for a subsequent
lightning strike does not arise.
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uncontroversially taken into account when damages are assessed.
B. Foreseeability and Fairness
1. The Basic Argument
Thus far, in trying to formulate an argument for ignoring the
preemption of the potential drowning in the Doomed Steamer Case,
we have looked for a cogent rationale for distinguishing between
such unforeseeable harm-causing states of affairs as falling bricks
and thin skulls, such that, when that rationale is applied to preempted
threats, preempted threats like icebergs will be ignored, but potential
threats like cancer will not be. No such general rationale, however,
has been identified. The Argument from Fairness presented here
takes a different approach. According to the Argument from Fairness,
even if there is not a rationale for the distinction between actual
harms like falling bricks and thin skulls that can be extended to
potential harms like icebergs and cancer, principles of fairness dictate
that preempted threats like icebergs should be treated as legally
irrelevant despite the fact that preempted threats, like cancer, are
considered relevant to damages.144
The Argument from Fairness runs like this: The baseline of
relevance for purposes of assessing tort liability is foreseeability, as
that term is ordinarily understood. If a state of affairs is
unforeseeable, it generally should be excluded from consideration
when damages are assessed. An exception is made in the case of
certain preexisting conditions, like thin skulls, associated with the
victim's physical condition that enhance actual injury. This feature of
tort law, whether or not based on a cogent rationale, is a well-
established fact.145 Given this fact, it is fair that tort law consider the
effects of the preemption of similar states of affairs, such as cancer,
that might have caused future injury. Since thin skulls (and other
144. See Douglas N. Walton & Hans V. Hansen, Argunents from Fairness and Misplaced Priorities
in Political Argumentation, 6 J. POL. & L. 78, 85 (2013) (describing the Argument from Faimess).
145. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31
(2005); 86 C.J.S. Torts § 31 (2012); PROSSER, supra note 116, at 261.
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personal vulnerabilities) will increase recovery, cancer (and other
personal vulnerabilities) should be allowed to decrease recovery. Fair
is fair. Tort law, however, does not take into account the harm-
producing effects of other unforeseeable states of affairs, such as
falling bricks, that harm the victim only because of a tortfeasor's
negligence. Thus, there is no reason to take into account the
preemption of the corresponding threats3 such as icebergs. The fact
that D's negligence preempted P's death as a result of the iceberg
should be ignored when damages are being assessed; the Doomed
Steamer Case should be resolved in favor of P. Stated in other words,
the argument may run like this:
(1) The fact that D's negligent conduct benefitted P by
preempting the threat from the iceberg should be ignored when
assessing P's damages because the preemption was
unforeseeable (in the ordinary sense of the word).
(2) It is not unfair to D to ignore the preemption based on its
unforeseeability despite the fact that some unforeseeable actual
harm increasers, such as thin skulls, which increase D's liability,
are taken into account.
(3) It is fair to take thin skulls into account because similar cases
of preemption, such as cancer, are taken into account.
(4) Since thin skulls cases and cancer cases in a sense "cancel
each other out," the law can simply apply the general norm that
in damage assessment, unforeseeable matters, such as the
preemption of icebergs, are to be excluded from damages
determinations.
2. Evaluating the Argument
It is somewhat difficult to assess the soundness of the Argument
from Fairness. On one hand, it may be argued that from the
perspective of fairness, it is not enough to permit the defendant to
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decrease his liability simply by reference to those unforeseeably
preempted states of affairs which, had they instead been realized due
to D's conduct, would have been considered relevant (i.e., cancer).
To preserve the fairness of the tort system, it is necessary to allow
defendants to decrease their liability based on the preemption of
additional states of affairs, such as threatening icebergs. This is so
because increases in liability due to unforeseeable preexisting
conditions of the victim are more burdensome to the defendant than
the advantage to defendants from decreases in liability based on the
preemption of corresponding threats.
First, decreases in liability based on preempted potential harms are
systematically more difficult to establish, and hence less valuable,
than the corresponding liability enhancements for actual harms. A
plaintiff who has suffered a harm due to an unforeseeable preexisting
condition will usually have little trouble establishing the necessary
facts related to causation to recover fully. For example, consider the
case where D has negligently thrown a tennis ball toward P's head
and P, due to a thin skull, suffers a severe injury and is out of work
for six months. Assuming D's negligence can be established, the
remaining elements of P's case should be easy to establish.
Circumstantial evidence clearly indicated that the severe injury was
caused by the tennis ball (in conjunction with P's thin skull). The
severe injury, which may have kept P in the hospital for 6 months, is
clearly the cause of P's loss of wages. In contrast, D, attempting to
mitigate his damages, will have a more difficult time establishing the
preemption claim that had he not thrown the tennis ball, some other
preexisting vulnerability would have prevented P from working. In
general, it is more difficult to establish counterfactual claims about
injuries that would have occurred than factual claims about injuries
that did occur. Thus, asymmetrical obstacles to proof undermine the
alleged fairness of ignoring some unforeseeably preempted harm
while considering some unforeseeably caused harms.
There is a second reason why it is arguably unfair to defendants to
take into account harm causing conditions, like thin skulls, while
only taking into account harm preempting conditions comparable to
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thin skulls, like cancer. Allowing plaintiffs to recover for harms
resulting from unforeseeable preexisting conditions may, in any
given case, increase a defendant's liability an indefinitely great
amount beyond what he could have reasonably foreseen. In contrast,
preemption-based decreases due to the corresponding states of affairs
may only decrease defendant's liability to zero. A fundamental
feature of our legal system is that plaintiffs will never be required to
pay the defendant for causing a beneficial preemption that exceeds
the magnitude of the harm caused.14 6 Thus, a defendant is responsible
for the entire additional harm that an unforeseen preexisting
condition creates, but can only capture a limited amount of the
benefit that might be conferred due to the unforeseeable preemption
of an existing condition. The effect of this asymmetry is particularly
pronounced in cases where the foreseeable harm to P is relatively
small. Due to an unforeseeable preexisting condition, like a thin
skull, D's liability may be far beyond what he could have foreseen.
D's liability, however, can only be reduced a small amount due to the
preemption of an unforeseen potential harm from a preexisting
condition. In at least such cases, D will have a viable argument that
in light of his unforeseeably large potential liability, he should be
able to mitigate his liability based on the preemption of potential
threats, including those from sources, such as icebergs, that are not
based on so-called existing conditions, like cancer.
3. An Alternative Argument
An alternative argument based on fairness runs as follows: When it
comes to tort damages, the baseline of fairness is that all effects of
negligent conduct-good and bad, foreseeable and unforeseeable,
caused and preempted-are taken into account ("universal
relevance"). The fact that unforeseeable thin skulls, high salaries, low
salaries, incurable cancer, etc. are taken into account follows from
this baseline moral assumption. Sometimes, however, it is fair to take
146. Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 582 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) ("Thus, this principlc [the
benefits rule] is intended to restrict an injured person's recovery to the harm he actually incurred, and
not to permit the tortfeasor to force a benefit on him against his will.") (citation omitted).
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certain sets of unforeseeable- matters off the table and out of the
damages calculus. But is it fair to do so only when a corresponding
matter that is either advantageous or disadvantageous to the other
party, as the case may be, is taken off the table? Since it is clear that
tort law does not take into account the benefits that P might have
enjoyed on the steamer, such as winning the ship's lottery, it is fair to
exclude from consideration the harms that P might have experienced
on-board, such as drowning as a result of an iceberg collision. Thus,
as a matter of fairness, the Doomed Steamer Case should be resolved
in favor of P. D should get no credit for the preemption of innocent
threats that are in some sense comparable to preempted benefits that
are excluded from consideration.
The advantage of this argument is that it avoids the problems of
asymmetrical obstacles to proof that arose with respect to the earlier
fairness argument. It is as easy to prove that P would have won the
ship's lottery as to prove that he would have been drowned if an
iceberg had hit the streamer. Both assertions concern hypothetical
events. Furthermore, the alternative argument avoids the symmetry of
damages problem that plagued the original fairness argument. By
excluding from consideration the lottery that P would have won, D is
getting a potentially unlimited advantage. By excluding consideration
of the preemption of the iceberg, D is only losing out on a mitigation
claim capped by the size of what otherwise would be his liability. To
the extent that ignoring a class of on-board events is unfair, it is
unfair to P who loses out on claims for potentially unlimited benefits.
But this might be rectified by allowing a larger class of harm-
preempting events to be excluded. The Doomed Steamer Case would
be fairly resolved in P's favor.
The greatest question about the previous argument is the strength
of its premise that the baseline of fairness is universal relevance. If
this is so, how are scope of liability rules, like the proximate cause
doctrine or the risk rule, to be accounted for? Along the lines of the
previous argument, it might be explained that it is fair not to consider
actual harms from unforeseeable states of affairs, such as falling
bricks, because actual benefits from unforeseen states of affairs are
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not considered. Consider the Hospital Lottery Case. In this case P,
after being injured in the taxi negligently driven by D, is taken to a
hospital. Upon his discharge, he purchases a winning lottery ticket in
the convenience store next to the hospital. He would not have
purchased this ticket but for D's negligent conduct. Although there
are not many cases on point,14 7 it seems clear that P's recovery would
not be reduced by the amount he won. Off-setting limitations on
actual harms, such as from falling bricks, and actual benefits, such as
from lottery wins-besides offering a novel justification of the.
doctrine of proximate causation-makes the background norm of
universal relevance seem plausible.
The difficulty with this argument is that it assumes under the
banner of universal relevance that D has a prima facie claim to credit
of matters advantageous to P, such as the preemption of potential
harms and the causing for benefits like hospital lottery winnings,
which explains why disadvantages inflicted are not held against him.
But this prima facie claim seems inconsistent with a fundamental
asymmetry in the law. If A intentionally and without prior agreement
confers a disadvantage on B-either by imposing a harm or
preventing A from enjoying a benefit-B is entitled to legal relief in
tort.14 8 But if A intentionally and without prior agreement confers an
advantage on B-either by preventing a harm or imposing a
benefit-A has no claim to the value of the advantage conferred.149
Thus, if D, through unilateral action, simply prevents a wild animal
from injuring P or informs P where a gold nugget may be found, D
has no legal entitlement to reimbursement and is due no more than a
pat on the back. This result seems to have a solid foundation in
morality. Under some views of autonomy, moral obligations cannot
be unilaterally imposed.' The law of unjust enrichment and
147. Id. (holding that where tortious harm to property made owners to decide to have property
annexed, which increased its value, recovery would not be diminished by increase); Lodato ex rel.
Lodato v. Kappy, 803 A.2d 160, 160-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that in a wrongful
birth case, a jury award for emotional damages could not bc offset by evidence of the joy of having the
child).
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2005).
149. Cline, 582 N.E.2d at 4.
150. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 95 (1974) (arguing that receiving unbargained
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restitution seems to reflect this principle.' 5 ' Thus, if D nontortiously
prevents P from boarding a steamer which turns out to be doomed, or
nontortiously sends P to the hospital where P wins a lottery, D is due
no more than a pat on the back based on the fortuitously beneficial
consequences of his act. If D tortuously causes the same results, why
should D not receive a lawsuit plus a pat on the back? The only
exception to the principle that unilaterally providing a benefit to
another accrues to the benefit of the provider are cases where one
party acts intentionally in situations, such as emergencies, where
prior bargaining over the value of the advantage is infeasible.152 For
example, if D breaks down P's door to put out a fire in P's home, D
will not merely receive a pat on the back and a judgment for trespass
to property, he will be entitled to a full defense under the doctrine of
necessity.153 The doctrine of necessity, however, is clearly driven by
the sound policy consideration to remove liability-based
disincentives to conduct with an expected net positive effect. Such
considerations are not present in the Doomed Steamer Case and the
Hospital Lottery Case. Again, the premise of universal relevance as a
baseline for fairness is placed in doubt.
Indeed, if there is a solid moral or legal foundation against a
person claiming credit for a gratuitously conferred benefit, why
would the principle not itself be enough to resolve the question of
preempted innocent threats in favor of plaintiffs? The answer, in
brief, is that the Doomed Steamer Case might not be best described
as one where a benefit-the preemption of a threatening iceberg-is
gratuitously conferred on P; rather, it is one where a potentially
harmful consequence of tortious conduct is not realized. This
perspective on the problem is considered at greater length in the next
Part.
for benefits creates no obligation to repay the person providing the benefits or to participate in activities
conferring benefits to others).
151. Providing a benefit without prior agreement or negotiation at most entitles the provider to
reimbursement of his costs, not the value of the benefit to the party benefitted. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49 (2011).
152. See, e.g., id.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965).
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C. Summary
The argument to this point has been complicated, and the reader is
owed a recap. The analysis of the problem of preempted innocent
threats began with the well-settled point that actuarial tables
regarding career length are clearly relevant to damages calculations.
If statistically predicted career-ending events should be considered,
why not more concrete ones, like doomed steamers? The answer
advanced was that, while actuarial tables predict foreseeable matters,
occurrences like doomed steamers are unforeseeable. It was
observed, however, while many unforeseeable matters were excluded
from damages consideration, like falling bricks, not all were, like thin
skulls. The distinction between falling bricks and thin skulls was
investigated to determine whether doomed steamers should be
governed by the rule that unforeseeable matters were excluded, or the
exception. That Part, however, failed to identify a distinction between
thin skulls and falling bricks that is both cogent and would imply that
doomed steamers should be treated like falling bricks and not taken
into account on grounds of unforeseeability. Next, this Part examined
the assumption that thin skulls are an exception to the rule that
unforeseeable matters are not considered in damages calculations.
Under a wider notion of foreseeability, they might be considered
foreseeable, and thus, would not be an exception. But under a wider
notion, doomed steamers might be considered foreseeable as well,
and so should be taken into account as much as predictions from
actuarial tables. Finally, an alternative argument, not relying on the
cogency of the general rule that unforeseeable matters are irrelevant,
was considered for understanding why the unforeseeability of the
doomed steamer should result in its not being considered. The
argument was that it is fair to exclude since other unforeseeable
matters are also excluded. The argument was found to be wanting.
Accordingly, the unforeseeability of the sinking steamer should not
prevent it from being a basis for a reduction in plaintiff's recovery.
747
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
III. LIMITS TO THE RELEVANCE OF PREEMPTED INNOCENT THREATS
The previous Part considered and rejected the position that the
preemption of innocent threats, such as the iceberg in the Doomed
Steamer Case, should be excluded from the calculation of damages
on the ground that they are unforeseeable. Beyond the fact that some
innocent preempted threats, like brain cancer, are clearly relevant,
however, the Article did not provide an affirmative argument for
taking unforeseeable innocent preempted threats into account. That is
the goal of this part of the article. As will be shown, the affirmative
argument implies certain limits to the relevance of preempted
innocent threats.
A. The No-Windfall Principle
As noted, when assessing damages, juries may take into account
actuarial tables that predict that, absent a plaintiffs tortiously caused
injuries, a plaintiff's prospects for wage-earning would likely have
ended by a particular date.154 Damages for lost wages are limited to
the period that plaintiff probably would have worked.' One
rationale for this doctrine is the No-Windfall Principle.5 6 Professor
Fischer suggested this principle in the context of the Merged Fire
Case.5 7 According to Fischer: "[f]rom a fairness perspective,
imposing liability for harm duplicated by non-tortious forces is
undesirable because it would give the plaintiff a windfall. Corrective
justice requires no more than that the plaintiff be restored to the
position that he would have occupied if the tort had not occurred." 58
Fischer argues where a tortiously set fire and an innocently set one
both destroy a property, an award to the plaintiff would be a windfall,
and so, inconsistent with tort's goal of achieving corrective justice.' 59
If a plaintiff received compensation for her lost property, she would
154. See Green, supra note 90, at 688.
155. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 1, at 466.
156. Fischer, supra note 13, at I127.
157. Id. at 1136.
I58. Id.
159. Id. at 1145.
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obviously be placed in a better position than she would have been
had the defendant not acted tortiously because, absent defendant's
conduct, she would have suffered an uncompensated loss. Likewise,
with respect to lost wages, it seems that fairness only requires that a
plaintiff who is permanently disabled as a result of a tort receive
compensation equal to the value of the wages earned up to, but no
further than, the time the plaintiff probably would have stopped
working due to some nontortious cause, as predicted by actuarial
tables. The No-Windfall Principle seems to imply that in the Doomed
Steamer Case, any recovery of lost wages by P would be a windfall
he is not entitled to since awarding compensation on these grounds
would put P in a better position than he would have been absent D's
negligence. Indeed, Fischer appears to supports a reduction of
plaintiff's recovery in the Doomed Steamer Case as well.160
The No-Windfall Principle is strongly suggested by the core tort
doctrine of factual causation.161 In typical cases where the
requirement of factual causation is not satisfied, awarding damages
would give plaintiffs a windfall in the sense of placing them in a
better position than they would have been absent the defendant's
tortious conduct. For example, P, who suffers from back pain, goes to
D to have her lower back x-rayed. In such circumstances, D has a
duty to ask P whether she might be pregnant before x-raying her.' 62
D, however, negligently fails to ask and x-rays P. As a result, P, who
was pregnant, suffers a miscarriage. It is subsequently determined,
based on P's testimony, that she erroneously believed that she was
not pregnant and that, if asked, she would have replied that she was
not pregnant. Thus, even if she had been asked, she still would have
been x-rayed. In this case, P will not be able to recover damages
160. Fischer offers the qualification that in matters of preempted threats, proof must be of "sufficient
clarity." Id. at 1146. Fischer never states, however, that proof required in matters of preempted threats
be any higher or more clear than proof with respect to any other issues. See generally id.
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 26-27 (2005).
162. Compare Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Ky. 1980) (finding breach of duty where
doctor failed to determine if patient was pregnant before performing numerous diagnostic x-rays on
her), with Cox v. Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620, 622 (Me. 1979) (finding radiologist not negligent for failing
to ask patient who was child-bearing age if she was pregnant when the risk of fetal abnormality resulting
from x-rays was so low that he would have performed the x-ray even if he had known she was
pregnant).
749
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
because D's negligence was not a factual cause of her loss.' 63 In this
case, recovery would place her in a better position than she would
have been had it not been for D's negligence, and so would be a
windfall. Core tort cases thus illustrate the No-Windfall Principle.
The No-Windfall Principle, however, is too broad to account for
the full range of tort cases. First, the case law with respect to merged
fire cases has been mixed. Consistent with the No-Windfall Principle,
some courts have reached the conclusion that plaintiffs should not
recover.IM Others, however, have not.165 Second, many courts allow
plaintiffs who suffer a miscarriage as the result of a defendant's
negligence to recover full damages for pain and suffering despite the
fact that had it not been for the defendant's negligence they almost
certainly would have experienced pain and suffering during normal
childbirth.166 Thus, these plaintiffs get a "windfall" in the sense that,
all things considered, their position as a result of the negligence-
pain and suffering from miscarriage and full compensation-is better
than it would have been-pain and suffering from childbirth without
compensation-absent the defendant's negligence. Third, in
wrongful death actions brought by spouses seeking damages for lost
support, lost companionship, and lost society, courts generally bar
evidence of remarriage, '67 despite the fact that if the new marriage
provides equally valuable companionship, an award would provide a
163. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 115, at 411 n.2 (citing Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977)). Because this is not a case involving multiple tortfcasors, courts would apply the basic
but-for test for factual causation.
164. See Kingston v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927) (dicta); Cook v.
Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 74 N.W. 561, 567 (Wis. 1898). See also Dcp't of Envtl. Prot. v.
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 337, 341-42 (N.J. 1976) (finding no factual causation where
nuclear power plant's discharge of unheated water into stream, in conjunction with cold weather, merely
allowed stream to reach its natural temperature, which was fatal to fish); Geuder, Paeschke & Frey Co.
v. City of Milwaukee, 133 N.W. 835, 841 (Wis. 1911) (approving Cook and holding defendant not liable
where the bursting of its sewer merely added to the flooding of a basement from extraordinary rain).
165. See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 49 (Minn. 1920); Kyriss v.
State, 707 P.2d 5, 8 (Mont. 1985) (upholding liability for medical malpractice when precxisting
arteriosclerosis and alleged mistreatment of toenail were each sufficient to cause plaintiffs gangrene).
See also FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5.1(b) (1978) ("Negligence may be a legal cause of [loss]
[injury] [or] [damage] even though it operates in combination with [the act of another] [some natural
cause] [or] some other cause if such other cause occurs at the same time as the negligence and if the
negligence contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [injury] [or] [damage].").
166. See supra note 57.
167. Marks, supra note 13, at 1414 n. 136.
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windfall to plaintiffs in the sense of putting them in a net better
position.
The final, and possibly the most significant set of cases that do not
appear to be consistent with the No Windfall Principle, are the "later
career" cases. If a person is injured, he may seek damages for his loss
of earning capacity.' 68 If a plaintiffs injury prevents him from
practicing dentistry, but permits him to maintain his high income
level only by becoming a salesman, a court may find a loss of earning
capacity and allow full recovery for lost wages.169 Since the plaintiff
receives compensation in addition to the wages from his new career,
he has realized a windfall relative to his expected earnings absent the
defendant's tortious conduct. However, the cases here too are mixed.
If a victim's injury prevents him from being a cosmetologist, but
permits him to work as a receptionist, a court may not find a loss of
earning capacity and deny recovery for lost wages.170
B. Identity and Loss
The No Windfall Principle should be qualified based on
considerations of identity. A painting of a seascape hangs above my
desk. If the water were turquoise colored rather than aquamarine, it
still would be the same painting, just with slightly different tones.
Likewise, if one of the gulls were repositioned, it would be the same
painting, just with slightly modified elements. But if the artist had
painted an abstract nude, it would not be the same painting. It would
not even be a modified version of the same painting-it would be a
different painting. In general, some attributes of an item may be
changed, and the item retains its identity. If too many change, or if
168. See generally 2 DOBBS, supra note 1, § 8.1(2) (discussing carning capacity and lost income);
Saul Levmorc, Self-Assessed Valuation Sstens for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 771 (1982).
169. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310, 317 (La. 1980). A similar case is Fruge v.
Hebert Oilfeld Constr., Inc., 856 So. 2d 100 (La. Ct. App. 2003). In Fruge, the plaintiff injured his back
in an auto accident. Id. at 102. As a result, he could no longer perform strenuous work as a machinist. Id.
at 103. His employer "made up" a job for him as a night supervisor, and a year later Fruge was retrained
to work as a computer numerical control operator. Id. With the new job, plaintiff earned over twice as
much as he previously did as a machinist. Id. The court found no abuse of discretion in an award based
for lost machinist wages. Id. at 106.
170. Alferoffv. Casagrande, 504 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
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the attributes that change are too core, then the item no longer exists;
another different but similar one does. How fragile the item is, i.e.,
how many hypothetical changes it can endure before it can be said
that the item did not exist, depends on the nature of the item and the
context of the inquiry.171
The importance of identity issues in tort law may be illustrated by
the doctrine of proximate causation. One way to formulate that
doctrine is that defendants are liable for the realization of only the
risks their conduct creates, not the realization of risks that already
exist. Thus, when determining whether an injury is within the scope
of a defendant's liability, it is important to determine whether the risk
that was realized was the same as a previously existing risk-even if
slightly modified by the defendant's negligence-or whether it is a
different risk created by the defendant's negligence. For example, P,
a hiker, asks D, a ranger, whether Trail TI or Trail T2 is the safer
trail. As D knows, on TI there is a risk of injury from lightning
strikes and black bears; on T2 there is a risk of injury from lightning
strikes, grizzly bears, and quicksand. D also knows that the total risk
to hikers on T2 is greater than on Ti. D, however, thoughtlessly
replies that T2 is safer. D thus commits an act of negligence. P takes
T2. On one hand, if P is harmed by the lightning strikes, the injury
will be found outside the scope of D's liability because the risk to P
of being struck by lightning existed independently of D's conduct. If
P had taken TI, he would have been exposed to the very same risk-
the risk of being hit by lightning-as the risk that materialized. On
the other hand, if P is injured by the quicksand, there will be liability
because this risk to P was created by D's negligently recommending
Trail T2 to P. The risk of quicksand was a different risk than P would
have been exposed to in the absence of D's negligence. But what if P
is injured by a grizzly bear? This seems a closer case because on TI
there was a risk of black bears. One way of framing the issue is to ask
whether the risk to P of injury from grizzly bears is a new risk
created by D's negligence, in which case there would be liability, or
171. See generally Teresa Robcrtson & Philip Atkins, Essential vs. Accidental Properties, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 21, 2013), http://plato.stanford.cdulcntrics/csscntial-accidcntal/.
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whether it is the same risk that P would have been exposed to
anyway (the risk of bears) just in a slightly modified form due to the
different type of bear, in which case there would be no liability.
Judgments about identity thus play a central role in the application of
the proximate causation requirement.
Considerations of identity can explain the exclusion of evidence of
remarriage in wrongful death actions brought by spouses seeking
damages for lost support, lost companionship, and lost society.172 The
theory is that the support, companionship, and society that the new
spouse provides, even if equally fulfilling, are fundamentally
different from those that would have been provided had the original
spouse lived. As the law sees it, in cases of wrongful death of a
spouse and remarriage, there is a loss of one thing (the
companionship of the deceased spouse) and a gain of something
distinct (the companionship of the new spouse), rather than an
annulment of loss by a later replacement of the same thing.'73 The
remarriage rule of evidence thus reflects the law's rejection of the
fungibility of people coupled with the principle that only where a
later gain is identical to one which would have been received but-for
the negligence will recovery be limited. Likewise, in miscarriage
cases, the absence of a set-off based on the preempted potential pain
from childbirth can be explained on the ground that the pain caused
by the miscarriage and the pain of child birth preempted are not the
same pain. Spatio-temporal location, as well as intensity and quality,
are identity criteria for pain. Only where a harm is identical to one
that would have occurred absent the defendant's negligence will
recovery be reduced.
The later career cases also can be usefully viewed through the
prism of identity. The issue of whether income from a new job will
offset losses from the termination of the job held at the time of a
plaintiffs tortiously caused injuries may be framed as the question of
whether the plaintiffs new job constitutes a new career or whether it
is just a different manifestation of the same career. In the former
172. Marks, supra note 13, at 1414 n.136.
173. Id. at 1414 n.135.
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case, the plaintiff has suffered the loss of a career, and the loss is
compensated through damages based on what she would have earned
in that career. In the latter case, the plaintiff enjoys the same career
and no compensation is due. For this reason, courts have tended to
award damages in cases where the plaintiffs new job involves a new
type of work, such as a change from dentistry to sales, but not where
the plaintiff may continue work at what may seem like a more
fungible position, such as being a cosmetologist and a receptionist.174
As in the remarriage cases, only where a later gain is identical to one
that would have been received but-for the negligence will recovery
be limited.
The mixed results in merged fire cases are also consistent with an
identity analysis of harms. When determining damages for a loss, the
relevant question is whether, but for defendant's negligence, the very
same harm would have occurred. This is the "identity of harm test."
Whether the plaintiffs in the Merged Fire Case would have suffered
the same loss but for the defendant's negligence may turn on the
degree to which items of property like houses are
anthropomorphized. People care greatly about when they die. When
it comes to death, time is relatively important when it comes to
identity judgments. If a person had died on a day other than the day
he actually died, we would likely say that a different death occurred,
rather than the same death just on a different day. Some items of
property, such as cars, are easy to think of as persons. Like people,
they have-or may be imbued with-individual characteristics that
identify them and make them distinct. Those who think of homes
analogously to people will therefore tend to judge that had it not been
for D's fire, P's house would not have suffered the harm it did. It is
plausible to think that the combined fire traveled more quickly than
the smaller naturally occurring fire would have on its own. It is also
plausible to think that the combined fire, being larger and more
intense, consumed P's house in a shorter period than the naturally
occurring one would have on its own. Thus, by advancing the time of
the destruction of P's home, D's tortious conduct caused a different
174. See supra notes 169-70.
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harm than would have occurred otherwise. Under this view, D, who
is entitled to compensation for the harm to' his property, would
receive damages based on the full value of the property at the time of
its destruction.
In contrast, it is also possible to think of items of property as
having an identity defined entirely by the utility they produce for
their owners. Viewing a home in this way, there would be less of a
tendency to view the destruction of P's home by the merged fire as a
different destruction than would have occurred anyway. Rather, there
would be a tendency to see it as the same destruction, only occurring
slightly later in time. This is so because the destruction of the core
property of a home-its ability to provide shelter for its owner-
would not be altered greatly if there had been no tortiously set fire
and the natural fire had destroyed the property not much later than
the combined fires would have. Viewed in this way, P's damages
might be nominal or limited to the rental value of the house for
interval between the time it was destroyed and the time it would have
been destroyed.
The concept of identity, admittedly, is a malleable one. Criteria for
identity vary with the type of object or event at issue and may depend
upon the context in which a particular question about identity is
raised. This Article's claim is that despite its malleability, identity is
a useful concept for analyzing issues of damages. It is flexible
enough to accommodate well-established cases, such as the
companionship and later career cases, and is contestable enough in
application to explain areas where courts have not reached consistent
results, such as the merged fire cases. 171
175. A similar approach is taken by Arno C. Bcht and Frank W. Miller in their work The Test of
Factual Causation in Negligence and Strict Liability Cases. ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE
TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 28-32 (1961). Becht and
Miller take the position that there should be no liability in cases where but-for the defendant's tortious
conduct, the victim would have suffered an injury that might be "equated" with the injury he actually
suffered. Id. at 28-32. For Becht and Miller, the critical question is whether the injuries that would have
happened arc "substantially the same" as those that actually happened or are different enough from
those that actually happened. Id. at 29-30. Becht and Miller discuss the issue solely in the context of
cases where a tortfeasor negligently causes a force, like a moving car, to impact a victim and where, but-
for the negligence, the same force would have impacted the victim. See id. at 28-31. They do not
consider cases like the Doomed Steamer Case where alternative forces-the taxi, the iceberg-arc at
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C. The Doomed Steamer Case Revisited
. Considerations of identity allow for a more refined analysis of the
Doomed Steamer Case. In the Doomed Steamer Case, P's lawsuit
against D would likely seek damages for pain and suffering, medical
expenses, and lost wages. The pain and suffering produced by the
taxi accident seems to be a different harm than the one that would
have been produced by the iceberg. Although an important feature of
pain is its intensity, spatio-temporal location as well as a pain's
psychological and qualitative features are relevant to its identity.
Accordingly, P will have a strong claim for damages from pain and
suffering.'I Furthermore, if D had not driven negligently and if P
had drowned on the steamer, P would not have incurred any medical
expenses. Accordingly, D's negligence was a but-for cause of P's
medical expenses and P has a strong claim to recover them.
In contrast, P's claims for lost wages are considerably weaker. The
identity of wages is likely determined by their amount, payment time,
and source. As a result of D's negligent driving, P did not earn wages
in a specific amount that would have been paid at a specific time, by
a specific employer. If D had not driven negligently and if P had
drowned on the steamer, P would have been deprived of those very
same wages. D's negligence was not a but-for cause of P's loss of the
wages he actually lost. He would have lost the same wages in any
case.
As a general matter, the identity conditions for nonevents, such as
the failure to receive wages, seem weaker than for events. The impact
of a force on an object, such as one that might cause injury or
produce a pleasant sensation, is naturally described as an event. Its
salient conditions are the time of the impact, the nature and strength
of the force, etc. In contrast, the failure of force to impact an object,
such as the failure of wages to be delivered to a person, is naturally
play. They offer no guidance regarding when injuries should be equated beyond noting that question is a
factual one. Id. at 30, 52-67.
176. Hart and Honor6 take the position that where, absent an actor's tortious conduct, a victim
suffering pain would have experienced an alternative nontortious pain, "there is an argument" for taking
the preemption of the nontortious pain into account. HART & HONORE, supra note 16 at 251. They
neither elaborate nor seek to refute the argument. Id.
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described as a nonevent. It is significantly less clear what the identity
conditions are since they are not defined by specific forces and
objects that occur at specific time and manners, but rather are defined
by the absence of specific forces and objects. Consequently, it is
more difficult for P to establish that the loss of wages he experienced
as a result of the taxi accident is distinct from the loss of wages he
would have experienced had he taken the steamer. P has a very weak
case for holding D responsible for his actual failure to receive
wages. 77
One implication of this analysis is that in cases like the Doomed
Steamer Case, plaintiffs will receive a windfall in the sense that, all
things considered, they have obtained a better result due to the
defendant's negligence. Consider a variation of the Doomed Steamer
Case in which P is only injured as a result of the taxi accident and
does not work for six months. In such a case, D's negligence, all
things considered, produced an advantage for P because it preempted
a life-ending accident. Nevertheless, under the analysis advanced
here, P would still recover damages to compensate him for the harm
D's negligence actually caused-pain and suffering on the day of the
accident and medical expenses that otherwise would not have been
incurred. There would be, however, no recovery for lost wages
because, but for D's negligence, the very same wages would have
been lost as a result of P's presence on the doomed steamer. There
should be no recovery for the loss of a benefit that, due to the threat
of an innocent force, would never have accrued.
177. Alternatively, we may note that the law treats cases of harms offsetting benefits and cases of no
harm differently. If D takes a vase from P and later gives an equally valuable vase as a gift-a
harm/benefit case-there will be liability for conversion. If P never takes the vase-a no-harm-caused
case-there will be no liability. Likewise, if D does not act and allows P to die-a no-harm caused
case-there will be no liability. If D saves P's life and later kills him--a harm/benefit case-there will
be liability for wrongful death. Turning to the Doomed Steamer Case, we might say that with respect to
pain and suffering, D's negligent driving caused P the harm of pain and suffering in a taxi accident and
caused P the offsetting benefit of avoiding the pain and suffering that would have occurred had the
steamer been taken. As in the other harm/benefit cases, there will be liability for the harm. In contrast,
with respect to lost wages, D's negligent driving caused no loss at all because if D had driven
reasonably P, drowning on the steamer cruise, still would not have received the wages. Like the other
no-harm cases, there will be no liability. The weakness of this argument is that it attempts to extend
principles from cases involving two acts by a defendant, such as a taking and a giving, to cases like the
Doomed Steamer, which involve only one act by the defendant.
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CONCLUSION
Simple questions do not always permit simple answers. This
Article has attempted to answer the simple question of whether a
negligent act's preemption of an innocent threat should be taken into
account when calculating a plaintiffs recovery. Arriving at an
answer necessitated consideration of a wide range of tort doctrines-
from proximate causation to the Thin Skull Rule to but-for causation
to damages in cases of miscarriage, remarriage, and changed careers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the passage through these swathes of law
yielded the paradigmatic legal answer: It depends. It depends on
whether the loss that actually occurred was the very same one that
would have occurred had the innocent threat been realized. And
whether an actual loss and a loss in a counterfactual world are the
very same depends on knotty questions of identity. This result,
however, should not be a cause for concern. Alternative approaches
turning on notions of foreseeability, avoidability, and the like are
equally contestable, less intuitive, and lack the doctrinal support
identity offers. When it comes to threat preemption, their preemption
should be viewed as no threat.
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